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Abstract
It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to undertake public action to prevent social dismay escalating into social disruption, they obviously need to draw on practical sensors. This paper assesses critically the adequacy of two such measures, the polarization (P) index, and the total relative deprivation (TRD) index. The paper proposes a tentative guide to selecting between these two measures. A review of three stylized scenarios suggests that, where income redistributions reduce the number of distinct income groups, and when each group is characterized by a strong sense of within-group identity, the P index surpasses the TRD index as a basis for predicting PSU. When the within-group identification is weak, however, it is better to use the TRD index to predict PSU. 
Kurzfassung
Introduction
Even highly developed economies can face the prospect of social unrest. Think of the December 2008 events in Greece, or recall the riots that erupted in November 2005 and November 2007 in the poor neighborhoods of Paris. Usually, social turbulence does not appear out of the blue. It goes without saying that any responsible government will seek to identify the potential for social unrest (PSU) as early as possible, allowing it to take steps to nip it in the bud.
What indicator could inform a government that social unrest is brewing? It is quite natural to expect that an early-warning measure could draw on, or incorporate, income inequality.
1
An intriguing body of empirical research seeks to find out what foments ethnic strife, violent conflicts, civil wars, and terrorism. The obvious objective of this body of work is enable governments to address the origins of social unrest and civil strife. If, for example, as Basuchoudhary and Shughart (forthcoming) find, economic freedoms and property rights significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorism will emerge, governments will want to promote economic liberties and market-friendly institutions. Clearly, tensions and potentials need to be measured. Our present inquiry thus complements the said empirical research in that we study ways to measure PSU rather than explore its root causes. Measuring tensions is a helpful tool in a drive to reduce tensions.
Following Runciman (1966) , a measure of an individual's social dismay was developed by Yitzhaki (1979) , and subsequently axiomatized by Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2006) . In line with a rich sociology literature, the measure was termed "relative deprivation," and was shown to be equal to the fraction of people earning more than the individual times their mean excess income. The sum of the relative deprivation of all the individuals in a population yields the population's "total relative deprivation" (TRD). This index can serve as a proxy for the "aggregated degree of discontent" of a population and could thus be used to measure PSU, since for any individual, an increase in the income of any higher income earner results in greater relative deprivation (even when the individual's rank in the hierarchy of incomes remains unchanged), and for any individual (except the richest), a decline in the number of earners of lower incomes results in more relative deprivation (even when the number of higher income earners and their incomes remain unchanged).
A second possible indicator that could be used to measure PSU is the "polarization" (P) index Ray, 1994, and Duclos et al., 2004) . Designed as a means of identifying the likely emergence of the tension between heterogeneous groups, polarization is taken to arise from the simultaneous sensing of within-group identity (or intra-group homogeneity), and between-group alienation (or inter-group heterogeneity): an individual's degree of within-group identification increases with the number of individuals who share the same "fate," when fate is measured in terms of income. The intensity of the within-group identification then depends on the number of individuals who share the same level of income. The feeling of alienation of a homogenous group towards another homogeneous group is measured by the difference in incomes between the two groups. Specifically, Esteban and Ray (1994) proceed as follows: they calculate the sum of a group's income differences from all other income groups (the alienation component of the measure), which they then multiply by the within-group identification (the identification component of the measure). Summing up over all income groups yields the P index. A fall in the number of income groups and a rise in the income inequality between the groups will both increase P.
In section 2 we present these two measures, and in section 3 we evaluate their usefulness as predictors of PSU.
2 In particular, we seek to find out under which conditions the two measures point in the same direction, and whether, as predictors of PSU, one of the measures is preferable to the other. 3 To this end, we analyze income changes in three stylized scenarios.
From Esteban and Ray (1994: 821) and Duclos et al. (2004 Duclos et al. ( : 1738 we know that the standard inequality measures may fail to generate admissible indicators of PSU in cases in which the P index succeeds. We find, however, that while the P index might indeed serve as a helpful sensor of PSU in some settings, in others its predictive power is poor. If policy design and implementation were cost-free, policy makers could safely act upon the more "pessimistic" of the two measures. Since implementation of policy measures is resource-intensive, there is a need 2 The need to resort to measures such as the P index and the TRD index stems from standard inequality measures falling short of the required sensitivity for predicting PSU. Consider, for example, the Gini coefficient. Let an income distribution change from I A ={2,3,35} to I B ={3,3,45}. Whereas the Gini coefficient registers a decline (the Gini coefficient changes from Gini(I A ) = 0.550 to Gini(I B ) = 0.549), the TRD index is rising (from TRD(I A ) = 22 to TRD(I B ) = 28) as there is more disgruntlement in population I B than in population I A . 3 In this paper we do not address the issue of the conversion or the translation of PSU into actual social unrest. This issue requires a separate analysis. But it is unlikely that social disorder will occur in the absence of PSU. In discussing stylized scenarios of income redistribution and biased income growth we seek to highlight the change in PSU rather than its likely manifestation.
to choose. We conclude that when the within-group identification is known to be strong, the P index is superior to the TRD index. When there is reason to believe that the within-group identification is weak, it is better to use the TRD index. Brief summary and concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
5 2 A measure of total relative deprivation, and a measure of polarization
Measuring total relative deprivation
Drawing on four requirements presented by Runciman (1966) , which together result in the sensing of relative deprivation, Yitzhaki (1979) derived a measure of the relative deprivation of an individual, RD. Let the incomes, , of n distinct income groups in a population be ranked from the lowest to the highest,
, and let i π ,
, denote the number of individuals earning income . Then, the RD sensed by an individual whose income is is defined as
where it is understood that ( ) 0 n RD y = ; irrespective of his (their) level of income , the individual(s) earning the highest income in the population does (do) not experience any relative deprivation.
n y Let , , be the fraction of those in the population whose incomes are smaller than or equal to . Then it can be shown that
that is, the relative deprivation of an individual whose income is is the fraction of those in the population whose incomes are higher than times their mean excess income.
The sum of the levels of relative deprivation of all the individuals in a population yields the population's total relative deprivation .
1 1
For a succinct proof of (2), see Stark (2006) .
We use TRD as a measure of social dismay, and we consider it a useful tool for predicting PSU.
Measuring polarization
Drawing on four axioms, Esteban and Ray (1994) derived a measure of polarization for the case of a discrete income distribution. Their P index is defined as follows:
where, as in (1)
, is the number of individuals in the population earning income , and is some constant. The degree of "polarization sensitivity," . If α is "low" (close to 1), the within-group identification component plays a smaller role than when α is "high" (close to 1.6), and the alienation between groups is more pronounced. Conversely, if α is "high," the within-group identification component is relatively important, and the alienation between income groups plays a minor role in determining the P index.
Since K is an arbitrary positive constant, for mathematical convenience we set 
In the remainder of this paper we use (5) to calculate (changes in) the P index.
5 When
, both the TRD index and the P index exhibit population homogeneity of degree one.
3 The P index and the TRD index as sensors of
PSU: three scenarios
We evaluate the usefulness of the P and TRD indices as tools for predicting PSU, and we ask under which conditions the two measures are on par. To this end, we present three stylized scenarios. We argue that it is the sign of the change in the value of the P index and the sign of the change in the value of the TRD index that should be of interest, since an increase (decrease) in an index reflects, or indicates, an increase (decrease) in PSU. Changes in the values of the P and TRD indices could be brought about by a variety of processes.
Scenario 1: Income redistribution from the poorer members of a population to the richer members of the population
Let the income distribution be 0 {3,3,3, 4, 6, 7} I = . Suppose that some of the income of the four lowest income earners is shifted to the two highest income earners, such that the resulting income distribution is . That is, while keeping aggregate income intact, the poorest individuals in the population lose income, whereas the richest gain. 1 {2, 2, 2, 2,9,9} I = The P index. The alienation component of the index increases. The identification component increases too (because instead of two small "groups" of low income earners, {3,3,3} and {4}, there is now a larger group of low income earners, {2,2,2,2}, and instead of two high income "groups," {6} and {7}, there is now a single group of high income earners {9,9}). Thus, upon reducing the number of income groups, the identification component of the P index increases, and simultaneously, upon stretching the difference between income groups, the alienation component increases. Therefore, use of the P index predicts an increase in PSU. Figure 1 illustrates this outcome for alternative degrees of the polarization sensitivity α. In conclusion: when the alienation component of the P index and the identification component of the P index simultaneously increase (decrease), then the TRD index will also increase (decrease). Therefore, a PSU guidance based on the P index is on par with that which is based on the TRD index. For the purpose of predicting the direction of the change in PSU, one measure is as good as the other.
Scenario 2: The poor catch up
Consider an income distribution 0 {2, 2, 2,3,3,10,10} I = . Suppose that the poorest individuals catch up with the middle income individuals, such that the resulting income distribution is . In conclusion: if the change in the P index and the change in the TRD index point in opposite directions, and if there are grounds for believing that the underlying environment is characterized by a high degree of intra-group identification, the "advice" of the P index should be attended to. If, however, there are grounds for believing that the intensity of the within-group identification is negligible, then the signal emitted by the change in the TRD index should carry the day.
Scenario 3: Biased income growth
Consider four individuals at two points in time: t , when the income distribution is , and 0 {2,3,6,7}
, when the income distribution is . That is, in time, all the individuals earn more, yet by different amounts. higher than approximately 1.25, the P index increases. Thus, a prediction based on the P index critically depends on additional information about the "degree or intensity of polarization" which is embodied in the parameter . α 6 Figure 3 illustrates. Thus, a TRD-based prediction of the change in PSU is that PSU declines.
In conclusion: if in the wake of biased income growth a population exhibits an intensified degree of within-group identification, and if a policy maker considers α to be close to 1.6, then the P index will guide the policy maker differently from the TRD index. Knowing in this case that 1 α ≥ is insufficient for the P index to increase. Without concrete information about the intensity of the within-group identification and an explicit procedure for transforming that information into an α value, the P index cannot tell us unequivocally whether PSU increases or decreases when income growth is biased. The TRD index, however, can.
Conclusion
Groping for indices that could serve as possible advance warnings of looming social unrest, we reviewed stylized scenarios in which changes in the P index and in the TRD index point in the same direction or in opposite directions. For a population of a given size, this review suggests that as long as the alienation component and the identification component of the P index rise or fall simultaneously, the sign of the change in the P index is in accord with the sign of the change in the TRD index (cf. scenario 1). When the sign of the change in the P index is the same as the sign of the change in the TRD index, either of the two indices will do as a predictor of PSU. However, as illustrated by scenario 2, the changes in the two indices may well yield conflicting predictions. If an income redistribution results in fewer distinct income groupsassuming that each group is characterized by a strong sense of within-group identity -the P index appears to be better than the TRD index as a tool for predicting PSU. When the alienation component and the identification component of the P index point in opposite directions, the P index can lack the consistency (hence reliability) conferred by the TRD index (cf. scenario 3):
the fact that depending on the magnitude of α (the parameter representing the intensity of within-group identification) the change in the P index can exhibit a sign reversal, hinders the applicability of the index, especially when policy makers have little to rely on in assessing the magnitude of α . When the policy maker knows the true value of α , and when this value is larger than one, the P index can be more potent than the TRD index. Refer again to scenario 3. In the wake of biased income growth, the population becomes highly polarized, which could lead to an increase in PSU (when alienation surpasses a certain threshold). The TRD index is not capable of capturing tensions of this type. Being aware that α is "large" in and by itself is insufficient to guarantee that drawing upon the P index will yield a clear-cut prediction of PSU. In sum, when the possibility of strong within-group identification can be ruled out, we are inclined to resort to the TRD index as a basis for predicting PSU.
If policy design and policy implementation were cost-free, we would conclude that policy makers should "follow the advice of the more pessimistic of the two signals." Since implementing policy measures is resource intensive, a choice needs to be made. We have sought to help guide this choice. 
